

VZCZCXRO8372  
PP RUEHFL RUEHNP  
DE RUEHRO #0969/01 2331535  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 211535Z AUG 09  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2562  
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0473  
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0188  
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0802  
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3357  
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 1913  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1386  
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1950  
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1799  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0451  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0930  
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0570  
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0278  
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0145  
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0497  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1616  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1961  
RUEHNV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0411  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4607  
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0002  
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 1596  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0866  
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0561  
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0424  
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1933  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0311  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2594  
RUEHPL/AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY 0039  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0518  
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY  
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0195  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0582  
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0115  
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0373  
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1421  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2051  
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3760  
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0192  
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 3968  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4856  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3034  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1027  
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000969

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019

TAGS: [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [EWWT](#) [KCRM](#) [NATO](#) [PBTS](#) [PGOV](#) [PHSA](#) [PREL](#)

PTER, IT

SUBJECT: ITALIAN REACTION TO EXPANDED CGPCS PARTICIPATION  
PROPOSAL

REF: A. STATE 66632

[1](#)B. STATE 4610

[1](#)C. ROME 1567

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Liam Wasley for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

[1](#)1. (C) On August 19, Acting Political Minister Counselor and Poloffs informed Italian MFA Director for Political-Military Affairs Massimo Marotti of the U.S. interest in expanding participation in Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of

Somalia (CGPCS) fora chaired by the U.S.(Ref A). Marotti told us he believed that the CGPCS had proved extremely useful, because it provided an umbrella to coordinate activity occurring simultaneously in multiple fora. He thought that the Working Groups had made the most significant contributions since they brought together those with the resources and will to tackle the problems. While Marotti acknowledged that contributions to the CGPCS need not be limited to providing military forces, he considered the lack of a clear process for accession problematic. He also was skeptical that simply expanding participation would increase CGPCS effectiveness. Marotti noted that China had previously expressed interest in joining the CGPCS, but the lack of a mechanism for joining had so far precluded action on China's request. Marotti also asked how the CGPCS decision-making process would be affected by new members, who were not part of the working group focusing on counter-piracy operational and intelligence support and coordination (Ref B).

¶2. (C) Marotti also noted that it would be helpful and more politically palatable if there were more transparent criteria for membership and for exclusion. For example, he posited that excluding all countries under current UNSC sanctions would be a better and more defensible standard, but acknowledged that Somali participation was critical to success.

ROME 00000969 002 OF 002

Comment

-----

¶3. (C) Marotti's less than enthusiastic response to the idea of opening up CGPCS membership to any country that expresses interest, regardless of its capacity to effectively contribute, may be due to a belief that expanded participation without clear selection criteria would dilute the influence of countries like Italy which have made significant contributions. It is also worth noting that membership in an "exclusive" body was instrumental in mobilizing resources and political will in Italy when the CGPCS was launched. (Note: Italy has one frigate each deployed to NATO's SNMG-2 (Standing NATO Maritime Group-2) and to the EU's ATALANTA mission. End note.) Italy has also amended its judicial procedures to permit the arrest and prosecution of persons suspected of piracy seized on the high seas (Ref C). End comment.

DIBBLE